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COMMENTARY
Law School Affirmative Action: An Empirical Study

The Shape of the Michigan River
as Viewed from the Land of
Sweatt w. Painter and Hopwood
Thomas

D. Russell

If general ideas and theories about what’s going on in society are going
to be anything other than moonshine, they have to be rooted in hardbought knowledge of what in fact is happening in people’s lives.

-J.

Willard Hurst (1910-96)

There are 5 African Americans among the 433 students in The University of Texas School of Law’s class of 2000. There are 7 in the class of
2001, and 7 in the class of 2002. With 1,387 students, the UT School of
Law is big. The 19 African American students comprise 1.4% of the total.
This year and for the two previous years, the percentage of African
Americans in the entering class at The University of Texas School of Law
has been lower than in the fall of 1950, the first year UT admitted African
Americans to the law school. With their June 1950 decision in Sweatt o.
Painter, the justices of the United States Supreme Court ordered the integration of the university’s law school and graduate school. In the fall of
1950, Heman Sweatt-the plaintiff in the NAACP-supported case-and
five other courageous African Americans enrolled at the law school. With a
total entering class of around 280 students, these 6 students comprised 2.1%
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of the entering class. Today, the UT School of Law is behind the fall of
1950. Seen differently, UT has come full circle.
A number of recent steps or factors have led to the near nonrepresentation of African Americans at UT’s law school. In 1992, four white plaintiffs filed a lawsuit-Hopwood v. Texas-in which they challenged the UT
School of Law’s use of race in admissions. Attorneys from the Center for
Individual Rights assisted the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs (Center for
Individual Rights 2000a). In 1996, a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the law school could no
longer use race as a factor in admissions (Hopwood 1996). Texas’s attorney
general at the time, Dan Morales, subsequently issued an opinion that
broadened the application of Hogwood to include admissions and financial
aid at all state universities and colleges (Morales 1997). Under the influence of the Hopwood opinions of the Fifth Circuit and General Morales, the
UT School of Law admitted the classes of 2000, 2001, and 2002.
Texas legislators and some University of Texas administrators have responded to the elimination of race as a tool in admissions. Texas’s
lawmakers passed legislation that guaranteed admission to The University of
Texas for the top 10% of every Texas high school’s graduating class, and
UT’s undergraduate admissions officers began to use a more-complicated
admissions scheme that takes into account a variety of socioeconomic and
cultural characteristics of applicants. The 10% plan and new admissions
procedures have returned to pre-Hopwood levels the percentage of students
of color who entered the university as undergraduates in the fall of 1999
(UT Office of Public Affairs 1999). A t the law school, however, the 10%
plan has no application, and although the law school’s admissions committee has recrafted the criteria for admission, African American and Latino
law students have not returned to pre-Hopwood levels.
After 1996, Hopwood bounced back to the trial court on remand and
presently is o n appeal again to a full panel of the Fifth Circuit. Some of the
law school faculty helped the state’s attorney general prepare the brief,
which argues in favor of a continuing though limited use of race in admissions (Cornyn e t al. 1999). My personal view is that most of the law
school’s faculty are fully committed to the theoretical proposition that the
university and law school’s ilse of race in admissions is constitutionally permissible. However, my personal view is also that the UT law faculty are less
committed to the practice of admitting African American and Latino law
students than they are to the constitutional theory that would support such
a practice. In Texas, persons of color are disappearing into this gap between
theory and practice.
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I. HARD-BOUGHT KNOWLEDGE AND MOONSHINE
The University of Michigan now faces the same legal challenge that
T h e University of Texas faced beginning in 1992 when Cheryl Hopwood
and three other white plaintiffs filed their reverse-discrimination suit
(Center for Individual Rights 2000b; University of Michigan 2000). The
state of Michigan is within the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, so the Fifth Circuit’s Hopwood decision has no application in
Michigan. Lawyers for the Center for Individual Rights, who represent the
Michigan plaintiffs and who also assisted the Hopwood plaintiffs, would like
to bring to the Sixth Circuit the Hopwood principle that universities may
not consider race in admissions. Eventually, the Center hopes to eliminate
race-conscious affirmative action within the entire federal system (Center
for Individual Rights 2000).
Now come the University of Michigan’s Richard Lempert, David
Chambers, and Terry Adams with a study that the Center for Individual
Rights’s lawsuit against Michigan’s law school has inspired. These three
University of Michigan researchers have patterned and titled their study
“Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law
School,” after William Bowen and Derek Bok’s important 1998 book The
Shape of the River. In their book‘s conclusion, Bowen and Bok observed that
‘‘So much of the current debate [concerning the use of race in university
admission] relies on anecdotes, assumptions about ‘facts,’ and conjectures
that it is easy for those who have worked hard to increase minority enrollments to become defensive or disillusioned” (Bowen and Bok 1998, 275).
Bowen and Bok sought to cheer up and empower those who favor continued
or increased enrollment of undergraduates of color. The authors, former
presidents of Princeton and Harvard, collected and analyzed empirical data
about the in-college and postgraduation performance of students admitted
under race-conscious schemes, and they found that these students succeeded
during and after college. Lempert and his coauthors have a more focused,
parallel goal with their study: examination of how well Michigan Law
School’s students, particularly students of color, fated as law students and
also how successful they have been with their subsequent careers. That is
the neutral, social-scientific description of their research aim, but there is
no reason to be coy about the study really being a defense of the University
of Michigan Law School’s use of race as a criterion in admissions. That
policy is presently under attack in litigation, and in order to defend the
policy, Lempert, Chambers, and Adams have marshaled what the late, great
legal historian Willard Hurst would have called “hard-bought knowledge of
what in fact is happening in people’s lives” (Hartog 1994,390). In the lingo
of sociolegal scholarship, the pull of the policy audience is strong in this
study (Sarat and Silbey 1988).

5 10 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

As with Bowen and Bok’s Shape of the River, the data that Lempert,
Chambers, and Adams have adduced are useful to check the truth of anecdotes, assumptions, and conjectures about race-conscious affirmative action.
Or, to quote Willard Hurst’s down-home language, these data help to expose as “moonshine” some arguments concerning the use of race in
admissions.
From my vantage point at The University of Texas School of Law, two
of the conclusions of Lempert, Chambers, and Adams merit special attention. The first is the central conclusion of the study, namely that the numerical criteria that figure most prominently in admissions-Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT) scores and undergraduate grade point average
(UGPA)-have almost n o predictive value with regard to the success after
graduation of Michigan Law School’s alumni (Lempert, Chambers, and Adaim 2000, 465-466). This finding can dispel some moonshine.
The second point I will emphasize in this comment is that the Michigan data show that law students value diversity as an aspect of their educational experience (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, 413-414). As I
am a UT legal historian, this point is particularly important to me. Fifty
years ago the justices of the United States Supreme Court ruled in Sweatt v.
Painter that the Texas State University for Negroes (TSUN) School of Law,
a “separate but equal” law school that the state and university had cobbled
together in order to fend off Sweatt and the NAACP’s integration challenge, was not equal to the UT School of Law because, in part, the African
American students of TSUN could only receive a n inferior legal education
in a school that lacked racial diversity (Sweatt v. Painter Archive 2000).
Another reason that the issue of diversity is particularly interesting to a UT
professor is because before 50 years would pass from the Supreme Court’s
Sweatt decision, the Fifth Circuit would debase diversity as a goal of admissions with its 1996 Hopwood decision.
The third and final point I will make in this comment is that Lempert,
Chambers, and Adams do not emphasize sufficiently that the University of
Michigan, like The University of Texas, is a state university. As such, each
state offers preference in admissions to its citizens as well as tuition subsidy.
In Texas, my observation is that the debate over Hopwood has reinforced
the assumption that the elimination of race as a criterion in admissions
somehow makes admissions a meritocratic process. But, at state universities,
this just ain’t so, as applicants from within the state gain admission with
lower numerical credentials than out-of-state applicants.’ Rumor has it that
the faculty of Michigan Law School think of their law school as a private
1. In her comments concerning the Lempert, Chambers, and A d a m study, Professor
Lani Guinier refers to the “ironic impulses of the British sociologist Michael Young, who
coined in 1958 the term ‘meritocracy’ to satirize the rise of a new elite that valorized its own
m e n d aptitude.” Professor Guinier explains: “Young argued that a meritocracy is a set of rules
put in place by those with power that leaves existing distributions of privilege intact while

From the Land of Hopwood 511

school, and the tone of the Lempert, Chambers, and Adams study does
nothing to disprove this rumor. As part of the defense of race-conscious
affirmative action at state universities like Michigan and UT, the faculty
and administrators, as well as their lawyers, ought to think hard about the
aims of the universities in light of their character as state institutions.

11. LSAT AND UGPA ARE UNRELATED TO CAREER
SUCCESS
In law-and-society parlance, the Lempert, Chambers, and Adams work
fits the classic paradigm of a “gap” study. Gap studies, an important even
though not currently fashionable form of sociolegal scholarship, examine
whether a particular rule or law in practice has brought about the results
theoretically anticipated or formally expressed. For instance, if legislators
passed a law guaranteeing a chicken in every pot, a gap study would check
pots looking for chickens; the term gap stems from the frequency with
which researchers have found pots outnumbering chickens. In this case,
Lempert and his coauthors looked at two possible gaps. First, they examined
the aims the Michigan Law School faculty had formally expressed for their
admissions policy, and second, they checked whether the criteria for admission helped t o predict the post-law school success of alumni.
“The test of a school’s admissions policy,” Lempert and his coauthors
observe, “is whether it meets the school’s goals with respect to overall class
composition and the kinds of persons the school seeks to enroll” (Lempert,
Chambers, and Adams 2000, 494). In 1992, the Michigan law faculty
adopted a policy in which they expressed a goal of admitting students who
were likely to become “esteemed practitioners, leaders of the American bar,
significant contributors to legal scholarship and/or selfless contributors to
the public interest” (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, 396).’ T h e
Michigan researchers find no gap with regard to this policy aim. In particular, Lempert, Chambers, and Adams find that Michigan’s alumni of color1,100 of whom the law school has graduated since 1970-have gone o n to
successful careers after leaving the law school. Lempert and his coauthors
find that the success of alumni of color is not distinguishable from that of
white alumni in measures of career satisfaction, contributions to the community, or i n ~ o m eThe
. ~ hard-fought data of Lempert and his co-researchers
convincing both the winners and the losers that they deserve their lot in life” (Guinier 2000,

573).
2. Lempert, Chambers, and Adams offer no evidence as to whether this formal expression of policy is actually meaningful to the Michigan faculty. For example, I cannot tell
whether an associate dean wrote the policy and the faculty approved it without discussion or
whether the faculty debated and thoughtfully considered the policy.
3. See, however, the companion comment of Professor David Wilkins. Professor Wilkins, an expert on the legal profession with a particular interest in the career paths of African
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expose as moonshine the claim that by admitting students of color using
race-conscious affirmative action policies, Michigan is merely setting those
students up for failure after graduation. Whether graduates of other law
schools-particularly less elite law schools-achieve the same career success
is a question that must await further study.
T h e gap that the researchers did discover is more intriguing. Lempert,
Chambers, and Adams found that the numerical criteria for admission ate
largely irrelevant ro career success. Right-thinking people should expect
that the criteria that professional schools use to select students would have
some predictive value concerning how well the students perform once they
enter their chosen profession. When we visit our doctors, we expect that
our doctors’ medical schools admitted them as students based on criteria
tending to indicate that they would become good doctors. However,
Lempert, Chambers, and Adams find that Michigan-like other law schools
including Texas-has emphasized admissions criteria that predict (sort of)
how well the students will do while in law school, but the admissions criteria do nearly no work in predicting how successful Michigan’s students will
be as members of the legal profession (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams
2000, 468). Lempert and his fellow researchers write that “LSAT scores and
UGPA scores, two factors that figure prominently in admissions decisions,
correlate with law school grades, but they seem t o have no relationship to
success after law school, whether success is measured by earned income,
career satisfaction or service contributions” (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, 401). That is to say, the criteria for admission help predict success while a student, but there is a gap between the imagined predictive
ability of the admissions criteria and the performance of graduates as professionals. This is true for all alumni, whatever their hue.
The Michigan researchers also found surprisingly little correlation between how well students did in law school and their later success in the
profession, as measured by income (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000,
477). In future analysis of their data, the researchers will provide more details with regard to this finding, but they now report that the grade point
average that students earned while in law school (LSGPA) explained less
than 5% of the future variance in income (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams
2000, 479). They note that “If LSGPA relates somewhat to some dimensions of lawyer competence, it is probably orthogonal to many others, and
may even have a negative relationship to some” (Lempert, Chambers, and
Adams 2000, 502). T h e researchers also suggest that the correlation between LSGPA and income “may be explained in whole or in part by the
role LSGPA plays in initial hiring” (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000,
American and other lawyers of color, finds that even when minority lawyers achieve the 5ame
levels of success as white lawyers, they often travel different and more difficult routes (Wilkins 2000).
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502 n.73). So, the Michigan researchers report that LSAT and UGPA do
not help to predict the career success of Michigan Law School graduates,
but LSAT and UGPA do some work in predicting how well law students do
in law school, as measured by their grades. However, LSGPA predicts only a
bit of the variance in the income of alumni. I will use these findings to
cheer up law students who do not get the highest grades in their classes.

I can imagine that some law professors would say that we have done a
sufficient job if we admit students who will do well in law school, even if we
know that the criteria we use for admission do not predict how well they
will do as lawyers.4 I would like to think, though, that anyone who is not a
law professor would expect that we admit students whom we expect to become good lawyers. Imagine, for example, if law schools rejected applicants
with letters that said “We reject your application for admission based on our
prediction that others are likely to earn higher grades in law school than
you, even though we really have no clue as to whether you would be a
better lawyer than those whom we are admitting. Good luck in some other
profession.” Honest law schools will start sending that letter in the next
admissions cycle.
The Michigan findings identify as moonshine the facile equation of

LSAT and UGPA with merit. In arguments about law school admissions,
these numerical indexes often serve as representations of merit. Lempert
and his fellow researchers note that theirs is “the first paper which indicates
that LSAT scores and UGPAs, the admissions credentials that the opponents of law school affirmative action would privilege for their supposed
bearing o n ‘merit’ and ‘fitness to practice law,’ bear for one school’s graduates little if any relationship to certain plausible measures of later practice
success or societal contributions” (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000,
496). O n e small criticism here is that Lempert and his coauthors should
recognize that both proponents and opponents of affirmative action privilege LSAT and UGPA as representations of merit. After all, even Michigan
relies on these numbers in admissions, and opponents of affirmative action
did not craft Michigan’s admissions policy.

4. Professor Guinier makes a similar point with regard to Lempert, Chambers, and Adams’s finding of a lack of relationship between LSATWGPA and public-spiritedness of
alumni: “Some may doubt the significance of this finding that traditional test-centered entrylevel predictors are failing us. Skeptics of the study,” Guinier predicts, “might remain resolutely committed to the conventional predictors on the grounds that although such indicators
fail to correlate with public service, that is not their ‘joh.”’ The skeptics will argue, Professor
Guinier suggests, that “Predicting who will do pvblic service or be public spirited is arguably
not the role of entry-level admission tests” (Guinier 2000, 570). As I note below, the citizens
and legislators of the states, when they subsidize education, may indeed expect that their
investment will yield some return in the form of public-regarding behavior by alumni of their
state’s law school.
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111. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY
The second important empirical finding on which I would like to comment concerns the value of diversity. During the 1998-99 year at UT, I
taught a small, year-long torts class with just 28 students. One day, we discussed the issue of whether the reasonable person standard of torts was a
gendered norm (Bender 1988, 20-25). For this discussion of gender, I split
the class into halves, with 14 men o n one side of the room and 14 women
on the other. After class, I joked with my African American student that in
the next class, I would put all the African Americans-him,
that is-on
one side of the room. In the fall of 1999, I taught a small torts class of 32
students but could not reuse this joke, as our registrar had not allocated 1 of
the 7 African Americans in the first-year class to me. If I were teaching one
of our large first-year classes of 120 students, I might have had 2 African
American students. Imagine teaching a first-year law school class in such a
nondiverse environment. How possible would it be to draw meaningfully o n
the life experiences of your students in order to examine, say, constitutional
law issues that implicate race?
Lempert and his fellow data hounds find that law students value diversity. The researchers surveyed alumni concerning the value to them of ideological, gender, and ethnic diversity as part of the law school classroom
experience. They found that women and students of color from the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s placed considerable value o n diversity (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, table 5A). White men who graduated in the 1970s
and 1980s found much less value in diversity than did white women and
students of color. Before the 1990s, less than a quarter of white men found
value in ethnic diversity, but in the 1990s, nearly half of Michigan’s male
graduates say that they placed considerable value o n the ethnic diversity of
their classrooms (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, table 5B). O n e
wonders whether the federal judges who will decide challenges to race-conscious affirmative action plans come from older cohorts of white male law
school graduates who value diversity less than the law school graduates of
today.
Lempert, Chambers, and Adams disclaim political correctness as the
explanation for sudden ethnic sensitivity of Michigan’s men of the 1990s
and speculate that the shift toward more white men valuing diversity may
have something to do with white men becoming a minority in the law
school of the 1990s (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000,417). Even so, I
think that readers will suspect that pressure to give the “right” answer explains at least a component of the 1990s shift. In any case, the data do
support the presumption of many educators that diversity enhances the educational experience of students. Indeed, Michigan’s law professors may be
interested to learn that Lempert, Chambers, and Adams have found that in
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the 1990s, Michigan’s students value diversity more than they value the
faculty’s scholarship (Lempert, Chambers, and Adams 2000, table 4; table
5A). Given the value that educators claim for diversity and the value that
students report placing on diversity, the editors of U.S. News and World
Report might consider adding diversity as a factor in the system by which
they rank law schools. Doing so would help to offset the penalty in U.S.
News ranking that law schools with active, race-conscious affirmative action plans suffer by admitting students with relatively lower LSAT scores
(U.S. News 1999).

IV. THE MISSION OF STATE LAW SCHOOLS
More than 100 of the 375 Texans admitted as part of the UT School of
Law’s class of 2000 would not have gained admission to the law school but
for a quota that the legislature has established for Texans. In Texas, state
law requires that 80% of the students the law school admits be Texans (Appropriations Act 1999; see also Levinson forthcoming). A t the undergraduate level, the Texan quota rises to 90%.
T h e language the legislators use to craft the Texas admissions quota is
remarkable for its frank acknowledgment of the potentially weak academic
qualifications of Texans so admitted. In the Appropriations Act, the legislators threaten to withhold all money for university salaries if in any semester
UT’s law school were to admit more than 10% nonresidents and deny “admission to one or more Texas residents who apply for admission and who
reasonably demonstrate that they are probably capable of doing the quality
of work that is necessary to obtain the usual degree awarded by [the law
school].” This language corresponds neatly with Professor Guinier’s idea for
how state universities might reduce their reliance on standardized tests.
“[Plublic universities,” she suggests, “might consider using the tests as a
floor, below which no one in recent memory has succeeded in graduating
from the institution. Above that test-determined floor,” Professor Guinier
proposes that “applicants could be chosen by several alternatives, including
a lottery” (Guinier 2000, 579). In Texas, the idea of such a floor already has
legislative backing, though not yet for the use that Professor Guinier
intends.
In the fall of 1997-the first post-Hopwood semester-I performed a
simple experiment to check the impact of the 80% quota. I asked the director of admissions for the numerical data but not the names of applicants.
After plugging admissions data for all applicants for the law school’s class of
2000 into a spreadsheet, I sorted applicants by their Texas Indexes-a combination of LSAT and UGPA-without regard to their residency. That is, 1
omitted the usual preliminary step of the UT admissions process, which is to
separate the applicants into resident and nonresident pools. Taking into
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account that admitted Texans have about a 60% likelihood of enrolling
while admitted non-Texans have about a 20% chance of enrolling, 1 used
the spreadsheet to “admit” a class of 475 students. I then checked those I
had admitted in my experiment against those the law school had actually
admitted. I discovered that around 109 of the 375 Texans who were part of
the class of 2000 would not have been admitted but for the 80% set-aside
that state law requires. Given the differential rate of enrollment of admitted
nonresidents, the state’s residence-conscious affirmative action plan resulted in the rejection of more than 300 out-of-state applicants with higher
Texas Indexes. Using the language of opponents of race-conscious affirmative action-for a moment-I could say that more than one-quarter of Texans at the UT School of Law gained admission under an affirmative action
plan that treated them as members of a group rather than as individuals and
that in so doing, the law school rejected three times as many better-qualified applicants.

My small admissions experiment led me to several conclusions and
thoughts. I saw that smug claims that the elimination of race as a criterion
for admission had restored a system of merit were moonshine. I also noted
that the great beneficiaries of this affirmative-action plan for Texans were
white, and yet they were largely unconscious of the great advantage in admissions they received. I knew that during periods when race was included
among the criteria for admission, students of color were always conscious of
the benefit they might have thereby gained and also always conscious that
other students and faculty might think of them in such terms. For example,
when students of color answer questions, they sometimes give wrong or
mixed-up answers-like every other student. When they misspeak in class,
students of color carry the additional burden of knowing that other students
and/or the professor may be viewing them as less qualified beneficiaries of
affirmative action. T h e color of their skin puts them under suspicion. I
knew, though, that white Texans admitted only because they were residents
never carried the same burden in class as students of color. White Texans
were free t o err without calling into question their qualifications for admission as students.

I conceived a dastardly plan to bring to light-in the harsh glare of the
classroom-the advantages that “less qualified” Texans were enjoying in
admissions. That is, my plan would emulate the socially constructed stigma
of skin color in the classroom and subject white Texans to the suspicion and
stigma of having been admitted on some basis other than merit. My plan
was this: Any time a student with a clear Texas accent gave a wrong answer
during classroom discussion, I would ask curtly, “Are you a Texan?” I would
then abruptly move on t o question another student, preferably a nonTexan.
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Just kidding. 1 never implemented such a horrible scheme. I try my best
to be humane in class and do not engage in ritual humiliation. But the
thought experiment helped me see more clearly the advantages that many
white students enjoyed, advantages that never come up for discussion when
Hopwood is the topic of conversation. One advantage is preferential admission for Texans. Another advantage, though, was the ability to enjoy the
first advantage without detection. Preferences for alumni-more important
at other schools than at my own-operate in much the same way. Imagine
if professors said to every student who said a dumb thing in class-“Is your
father an alumnus?”
My spreadsheet admissions experiment led me to think more broadly
about the reasons that Texas legislators set aside four-fifths of the law
school seats for Texans. First, one should begin by admitting that the setaside is necessary. Texans cannot win the spots o n their own. For one thing,
Texans have to compete with all the rest of the country, and there are a lot
of qualified applicants outside the Lone Star state. However, Texas is also a
state that underfunds primary, secondary, and higher education. Therefore,
Texans are unprepared to compete o n a level playing field with all other law
school applicants. They need the boost.

1 also thought about the preferential admission of Texans in instrumental terms. Following the broad, general lessons of Willard Hurst, I conceived of the law school as an agent of the state and an instrument of state
policy. Just as a state might choose to subsidize a particular industry-say,
the lumber industry in Wisconsin-Texas
legislators had chosen to subsidize legal education for Texans (Hurst 1964; see also Law and History Review
2000). Not only do Texans enjoy a subsidy with regard to admissions standards, they also enjoy a tuition subsidy, as UT School of Law’s tuition is at
least $10,000 below the market rate. In effect, the admissions committee of
the law school delivers a three-year, $10,000 per year educational subsidy t o
each admitted Texan. This amounts to roughly $11 million dollars per year.
Again, thinking of law as an instrument that legislators and others use to
achieve particular ends, I wondered whether the way the admissions committee distributed the $11 million per year would be satisfying politically to
legislators. What if, for example, a small immunization program with funding of $1 1 million delivered vaccinations almost exclusively to children in a
few white neighborhoods of Texas? Such a result would be politically
unacceptable.
T h e state institutional character of UT and also the University of
Michigan-where
resident applicants also benefit from an admissions advantage-opens up the possibility of a different sort of gap study. The citizens of both states-or their legislators-might ask whether the admissions
practices of the state universities are advancing the goals of tuition subsidy
and residence-conscious admissions. What value does the state receive by
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making admission easier and tuition lower for its residents? Lempert, Chambers, and Adams focus o n the goals of the Michigan faculty; they might also
broaden their inquiry by conceiving of the faculty goals as expressions of
state policy. W e can ask whether the chickens are getting into pots, but we
should also ask whether the right pots are getting chickens. Such a study
would require that state law schools, state universities, and legislators first
define just what the goals of state universities ought to be. This definitional
project is underway in a number of states already. With the goals of statesponsored professional training in mind, educators and legislators can work
together to determine whether present patterns of admissions will best meet
these goals and serve the needs of states in the twenty-first century. Perhaps
educators and politicians will agree that the best practice is to subsidize the
educations of those who have the highest test scores. I suspect, though, that
a thoughtful inquiry will yield a more diverse result.

V. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Hopwood, the number of students of color at The
University of Texas has declined to a trickle, putting us behind the fall of
1950. The University of Michigan Law School is now engaged in litigation
that will determine whether its affirmative action policy can endure or
whether instead the University of Michigan’s river of alumni of color will
also turn to a trickle. Richard Lempert, David Chambers, and Terry Adams’s study is valuable in the narrow context of Michigan’s litigation but
also important within the broader national debate taking place over raceconscious affirmative action. T h e hard-fought data that these able Michigan researchers have collected and analyzed help to dissipate some moonshine. Most important from my point of view, Lempert, Chambers, and
Adams have shown that LSAT and UGPA-the
numerical criteria on
which Michigan and so many other law schools rely in admissions-have
almost no predictive value concerning the success graduates will have with
their careers after they leave Michigan. Put simply, LSAT and UGPA are
not proxies for merit. The Michigan researchers also show that Michigan
law students value diversity and regard a diverse legal education as a better
education. These two findings, coupled as I think they should be with serious thought about the instrumental role of state law schools as agents of
state policy, can assist judges, educators, and other policymakers in crafting
and maintaining admissions policies that meet the goals of states seeking to
train professionals to meet the diverse challenges of the twenty-first
century.
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